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Abstract. The well-known forking lemma by Pointcheval and Stern has
been used to prove the security of the so-called generic signature schemes.
These signature schemes are obtained via the Fiat-Shamir transform
from three-pass identiﬁcation schemes. A number of ﬁve-pass identiﬁ-
cation protocols have been proposed in the last few years. Extending
the forking lemma and the Fiat-Shamir transform would allow to ob-
tain new signature schemes since, unfortunately, these newly proposed
schemes fall outside the original framework. In this paper, we provide an
extension of the forking lemma in order to assess the security of what we
call n-generic signature schemes. These include signature schemes that
are derived from certain (2n + 1)-pass identiﬁcation schemes. We thus
obtain a generic methodology for proving the security of a number of
signature schemes derived from recently published ﬁve-pass identiﬁca-
tion protocols, and potentially for (2n + 1)-pass identiﬁcation schemes
to come.
Keywords: signature schemes, forking lemma, identiﬁcation schemes.
1 Introduction
The focus of this work is on methodologies to prove the security of digital sig-
nature schemes. Thus, instead of providing security reductions from scratch, the
goal is to provide security arguments for a class of signature schemes, as previ-
ously done in [12,13,9,1,19]. In particular, we aim at extending a pioneering work
by Pointcheval and Stern [12] where a reduction technique was introduced to ob-
tain security arguments for the so-called generic signature schemes. These security
arguments allow for simple proofs and for eﬃcient signature schemes. Moreover,
this type of signature schemes can be derived from identiﬁcation schemes if the
latter satisfy certain requirements.
Generic Signature Schemes. Pointcheval and Stern call generic signature schemes
those whose signatures are of the form σ = (σ0, h1, σ1), where σ0 is uniformly
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distributed over a large set, h1 = H(m,σ0) with H being a hash function mod-
eled as a random oracle, m is the message to be signed and σ1 depends just on
σ0 and h1.
The works [12,13] provide security arguments for generic signature schemes
thanks to the use of the forking lemma. This lemma states that a successful forger
can be restarted with a diﬀerent random oracle in order to get two distinct but
related forgeries. If the generic signature schemes additionally enjoy the existence
of a polynomial-time algorithm, called extractor, that recovers the signing key
from two signatures σ = (σ0, h1, σ1) and σ
′ = (σ0, h′1, σ
′
1) with h1 = h′1, then
unforgeability is guaranteed under a supposedly intractable problem.
Unfortunately, the forking lemma is restricted to 3-tupled signatures. One
would like to obtain an unbounded version of this lemma for signatures of
the form (σ0, h1, σ1, . . . , hn, σn) where hi = Hi(m,σ0, h1, σ1, . . . , hi−1, σi−1) for
n ∈ N. This would allow to address a greater class of signatures. In this work,
we provide such an extension and apply it to assess the security of n-generic
signature schemes. Roughly speaking, n-generic signature schemes are built as
generic signature schemes but are not restricted in the number of tuple entries
as mentioned above.
From Identiﬁcation Schemes to Signature Schemes. One of the ways to build a
signature scheme is to depart from an existing identiﬁcation protocol and convert
it into a signature scheme using the well-known Fiat-Shamir (FS) paradigm [5].
In an identiﬁcation protocol a series of messages are exchanged between two
parties, called prover and veriﬁer, in order to enable a prover to convince a
veriﬁer that it knows a given secret. Zero-knowledge identiﬁcation protocols [7]
convince a veriﬁer without revealing any other information whatsoever about
the secret itself. Informally, the FS paradigm builds a signature scheme as the
transcript of one execution of the identiﬁcation scheme, where the challenges
sent by the veriﬁer are replaced by the output of a secure hash function having
as input the message and the current transcript.
In [12] the signatures obtained by applying the FS transform to canonical iden-
tiﬁcation schemes were generalized to the concept of generic signatures schemes.
Schematically, in a canonical identiﬁcation scheme a prover sends ﬁrst a com-
mitment Com, then receives a challenge Ch drawn from a uniform distribution,
and ﬁnishes the interaction with a message, called response Rsp. Finally, the
veriﬁer applies a verifying algorithm to the prover’s public key, determining ac-
ceptance or rejection. In addition, the identiﬁcation protocol needs to satisfy
special-soundness. Roughly, special-soundness means there exists a polynomial-
time algorithm which is able to extract the witness of the prover, given two
correlated transcripts (Com,Ch,Rsp), (Com′,Ch′,Rsp′) with Com = Com′ and
Ch = Ch′.
Many zero-knowledge identiﬁcation schemes have been proposed whose
conversion to signature schemes lead to generic signature schemes like [5,6,17].
However, several signature schemes which are derived from 5-pass identiﬁca-
tion protocols are not covered by the abstraction above. Thus, we are obliged
to prove their security from scratch. Examples of schemes falling outside the
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Pointcheval-Stern framework can be found in [3,16,17,4,10,11,15,8,18]. The au-
thors must provide direct proofs for the signature schemes in these works deriving
from 5-pass identiﬁcation. These proofs often appear quite complex. Moreover,
the authors of [14] recently left open to ﬁnd a security reduction for signatures
derived from a 5-pass identiﬁcation protocol. We show that all aforementioned 5-
pass identiﬁcation schemes give raise to 2-generic signature schemes. We isolate
a property, called n-soundness, that implies unforgeability of all the schemes
satisfying it. Informally, n-soundness means that the signing key can be ex-
tracted from two correlated valid signatures σ = (σ0, h1, . . . , σn−1, hn, σn) and
σ′ = (σ0, h1, . . . , σn−1, h′n, σ
′
n) with hn = h′n. In particular, we prove in Section
4 the security of the resulting signature scheme from [14], which was missing in
the original paper.
Related Work. Pointcheval and Stern [12,13] provided security arguments for
generic signature schemes. However, these generic signature schemes are restric-
tive in the sense that (a) they allow transformations only based on canonical
identiﬁcation schemes, and (b) there exists an extractor for these schemes. The
work of Abdalla et al. [1] introduced a new transformation from identiﬁcation
schemes (IS) to signature schemes (SS) without insisting on the existence of such
an extractor. Nonetheless, they require again canonical IS. Ohta and Okamoto
[9] assume that the IS is honest-veriﬁer (perfect) zero-knowledge and that it
is computationally infeasible for a cheating prover to convince the veriﬁer to
accept. Again, this result is valid only for three-pass IS.
Very recently, Yao and Zhao [19] presented what they call challenge-divided
Fiat-Shamir paradigm. Here, security results are set for three-pass IS with di-
vided random challenges. Even though they consider more challenges, still iden-
tiﬁcation schemes with more than three interactions are not captured by their
paradigm. In this work, we consider an unlimited number of challenges as long as
they are randomly chosen from large enough sets. To the best of our knowledge
this is the ﬁrst transformation which gives generic security statements for SS
derived from (2n+ 1)-pass IS.
Organization. We introduce in Section 2 the necessary background to understand
the paper. In Section 3 we present the notion of n-generic signature schemes and
provide an extended forking lemma that applies to this new signature type.
We exemplify in Section 4 our paradigm and derive a provably secure 2-generic
signature scheme based on multivariate polynomials.
2 Preliminaries
We begin by introducing some notations and brieﬂy reviewing some deﬁnitions. A
function μ(·) is negligible in n, or just negligible, if for every positive polynomial
p(·) and all suﬃciently large n it holds that μ(n) < 1/p(n). Otherwise, we
call μ(·) non-negligible. Note that the sum of two negligible functions (resp.
non-negligible) is again negligible (resp. non-negligible) whereas the sum of one
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non-negligible function π(·) and one negligible function μ(·) is non-negligible,
i.e. there exists a positive polynomial p(·) such that for inﬁnitely many n’s it
holds that π(n) + μ(n) > 1/p(n).
Two distributions ensembles {Xn}n∈N and {Yn}n∈N are said to be (computa-
tionally) indistinguishable, if for every non-uniform polynomial-time algorithm
D, there exists a negligible function μ(·) such that
|Pr[D(Xn) = 1]− Pr[D(Yn) = 1] | ≤ μ(n).
We write s
$←− AO(x) to denote the output s by a probabilistic algorithm A with
input x having black-box access to an oracle O. In particular, this means, that
A may query oracle O in order to derive s from its answers.
Digital Signatures. In the following we give the deﬁnition of a signature scheme
together with the corresponding standard security level.
Definition 1 (Signature scheme). A signature scheme is a collection of the
following algorithms S = (KGen, Sign,Vf) deﬁned as follows.
KGen(1κ) is a probabilistic algorithm which, on input a security parameter 1κ,
outputs a secret and a public key (sk, pk).
Sign(sk,m) is a probabilistic algorithm which, on input a secret key sk and a
message m, outputs a signature σ.
Vf(pk,m, σ) is a deterministic algorithm which, on input a public key pk, a
message m and a signature σ, outputs either 1 (= valid) or 0 (= invalid).
We require correctness of the veriﬁcation, i.e., the veriﬁer will always accept
genuine signatures. More formally, for all (sk, pk) ← KGen(1κ), any message m,
any σ ← Sign(sk,m), we always have Vf(pk,m, σ) = 1.
From signature schemes we require that no outsider should be able to forge a
signer’s signature. The following deﬁnition captures this property formally.
Definition 2 (Unforgeability of a Signature Scheme). A signature scheme
S = (KGen, Sign,Vf) is existentially unforgeable under (adaptively) chosen-
message attacks if for any eﬃcient algorithm A making at most qs oracle queries,
the probability that the following experiment returns 1 is negligible:
Experiment UnforgeabilitySA(κ)
(sk, pk)
$←− KGen(1κ)
(σ∗,m∗) $←− ASign′(·)(pk)
Sign′(·) on input m outputs σ $←− Sign(sk,m)
Return 1 iﬀ
Vf(pk,m∗, σ∗) = 1 and m∗ was not queried to Sign′(·) by A
The probability is taken over all coin tosses of KGen, Sign, and A.
Note that qs is bounded by a polynomial in the security parameter κ. Deﬁnition 2
captures unforgeability against adaptively chosen-message attacks for signature
schemes. Unforgeability against no-message attacks is deﬁned analogously but
qs must be 0.
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Splitting Lemma. The following lemma is extensively used in the forking lemma
proofs. It states that one can split a given set X into two subsets, (a) a non-
negligible subset Ω consisting of ”good” x’s which provides a non-negligible
probability of success over y, and (b) its complement, consisting of ”bad” x’s.
Lemma 1 (Splitting Lemma [12, Lemma 3]). Let A be a subset of X × Y
such that Pr [A(x, y)] ≥ , then there exist Ω ⊂ X such that
1. Pr [x ∈ Ω] ≥ /2
2. If a ∈ Ω, then Pr [A(a, y)] ≥ /2.
See [12, Lemma 3] for the proof.
3 Extended Security Arguments for Digital Signatures
In this section we give the formal deﬁnition of an n-generic signature scheme and
extend the forking lemma accordingly. This allows us to prove that any n-generic
signature scheme satisfying what we call n-soundness is existentially unforgeable
in the random oracle model.
3.1 n-Generic Signature Schemes
Let Hi denote a hash function with output of cardinality 2
κi (derived from the
security parameter κ).
Definition 3 (n-Generic Signature Scheme). Ann-generic signature scheme
is a digital signature scheme S = (KGen, Sign,Vf) with the following properties:
Structure A signature σ for a message m is of the form (σ0, h1, . . . , σn−1, hn, σn)
where h1 = H1(m,σ0) and hi = Hi(m,σ0, . . . , hi−1, σi−1) for i = 2, . . . , n
with Hi being modeled as a random oracle. σi depends on previous σ0, . . . , σi−1
and hash values h1, . . . , hi for i = 1, . . . , n.
Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge (HVZK) Assume the hash functions Hi
are modeled by publicly accessible random oracles. There exists a PPT algo-
rithm Z, the zero-knowledge simulator, controlling the random oracles, such
that for any pair of PPT algorithms D = (D0, D1) the following distributions
are computationally indistinguishable:
– Let (pk, sk,m, state) ← D0(1κ). If pk belongs to sk, then set
σ = (σ0, h1, . . . , σn−1, hn, σn) ← Sign(sk,m), else σ ← ⊥. Output
D1(σ, state).
– Let (pk, sk,m, state) ← D0(1κ). If pk belongs to sk, then set
σ = (σ0, h1, . . . , σn−1, hn, σn) ← Z(pk,m, 1), else σ ← Z(pk,m, 0).
Output D1(σ, state).
Notice that the structure of a generic signature as originally proposed in [12]
matches that of a 1-generic signature. For the sake of simplicity we occasionally
write σ = (σ0, . . . , σn, h1 . . . , hn) instead of (σ0, h1, . . . , σn−1, hn, σn).
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3.2 An Extended Forking Lemma
Pointcheval and Stern introduced in [12] the forking lemma as a technique to
prove the security of some families of signature schemes, namely generic signature
schemes with special-soundness. This well-known lemma is applied to get two
forgeries for the same message using a replay attack, after that, one can use the
two obtained forgeries to recover the secret key. They also show that a successful
forger in the adaptive chosen-message attack model implies a successful forger
in the no-message attack model, as long as the honest-veriﬁer zero-knowledge
property holds. In the following we propose an extension of the original forking
lemma that applies to n-generic signature schemes. We ﬁrst provide the Extended
Forking Lemma in the no-message attack model.
No-Message Attack Model
Lemma 2. Let S be an n-generic signature scheme with security parameter κ.
Let A be a PPT Turing machine given only the public data as input. If A can ﬁnd
a valid signature (σ0, . . . , σn, h1, . . . , hn) for a message m with a non-negligible
probability, after asking the n random oracles O1, . . . ,On polynomially often (in
κ), then, a replay of this machine with the same random tape, the same ﬁrst
oracles O1, . . . ,On−1 and a diﬀerent last oracle On, outputs two valid signatures
(σ0, . . . , σn, h1, . . . , hn) and (σ0, . . . , σ
′
n, h1, . . . , h
′
n) for the same message m with
a non-negligible probability such that hn = h′n.
Proof. We are given a no-message adversary A, which is a PPT Turing machine
with a random tape ω taken from a set Rω. During the attack, A may ask
q1, . . . , qn (polynomially bounded in κ) queries to random oracles O1, . . . ,On
with q
(i)
j denoting the j-query to oracle Oi. We denote by q(i)1 , . . . , q(i)qi the qi
distinct queries to the random oracles Oi and let r(i) = (r(i)1 , . . . , r(i)qi ) be the
answers of Oi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let Sqii denote the set of all possible answers from
Oi, i.e., {r(i)1 , . . . , r(i)qi } ∈ Sqii . Furthermore, we denote by
E the event that A can produce a valid signature (σ0, . . . , σn, h1, . . . , hn) for
message m by using random tape ω and the answers r
(i)
1 , . . . , r
(i)
qi for i ≤ n.
Note that a valid signature implies hi = Oi(m,σ0, h1, . . . , hi−1, σi−1).
F the event that A has queried the oracle On with input
(m,σ0, h1, . . . , hn−1, σn−1), i.e.,
∃j ≤ qn : q(n)j = (m,σ0, h1, . . . , hn−1, σn−1).
Accordingly, its complement ¬F denotes
∀j ≤ qn : q(n)j = (m,σ0, h1, . . . , hn−1, σn−1).
By hypothesis of the lemma, the probability that event E occurs (Pr[E ]), is non-
negligible, i.e., there exists a polynomial function T (·) such that Pr[E ] ≥ 1T (κ) .
We know that
Pr[E ] = Pr[E ∧ F ] + Pr[E ∧ ¬F ] . (1)
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Furthermore, we get
Pr [hn = On(m,σ0, h1, . . . , hn−1, σn−1) ∧ ¬F ]
= Pr [hn = On(m,σ0, h1, . . . , hn−1, σn−1) | ¬F ] · Pr[¬F ]
≤ Pr [hn = On(m,σ0, h1, . . . , hn−1, σn−1) | ¬F ]
≤ 1
2kn
,
because the output of On is unpredictable. The event E implies that
hn = On(m,σ0, h1, . . . , hn−1, σn−1), and thus we get
Pr[E ∧ ¬F ] ≤ Pr [hn = On(m,σ0, h1, . . . , hn−1, σn−1) ∧ ¬F ] ≤ 1
2kn
(2)
Relations (1) and (2) lead to
Pr[E ∧ F ] ≥ 1
T (κ)
− 1
2kn
≥ 1
T ′(κ)
(3)
Note that a polynomial T ′(·) must exist since the diﬀerence between a non-
negligible and negligible term is non-negligible. Therefore, ∃l ≤ qn so that
Pr
[
E ∧ q(n)l = (m,σ0, h1, . . . , hn−1, σn−1)
]
≥ 1
qnT ′(κ)
.
Indeed, if we suppose that, ∀l ∈ {1, . . . , qn},
Pr
[
E ∧ q(n)l = (m,σ0, h1, . . . , hn−1, σn−1)
]
<
1
qnT ′(κ)
then,
Pr[E ∧ F ] = Pr
[
E ∧ (∃j ≤ qn, q(n)j = (m,σ0, h1, . . . , hn−1, σn−1))
]
≤
qn∑
j=1
Pr
[
E ∧ q(n)j = (m,σ0, h1, . . . , hn−1, σn−1)
]
<
qn
qnT ′(κ)
=
1
T ′(κ)
This leads to a contradiction with (3). Further, we deﬁne
B = {(ω, r(1), . . . , r(n)) s.t. E ∧ q(n)l = (m,σ0, h1, . . . , hn−1, σn−1)}.
Since, B ⊂ Rω × Sq11 × . . . × Sqnn and Pr[B] ≥ 1qnT ′(κ) , by using the splitting
lemma we have:
– ∃Ω ⊂ Rω such that Pr[ω ∈ Ω] ≥ 12qnT ′(κ) .
– ∀ω ∈ Ω, Pr[ (ω, r(1), . . . , r(n)) ∈ B] ≥ 12qnT ′(κ) , where the probability is
taken over Sq11 × . . .× Sqnn .
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We deﬁne
B′ = {(ω, r(1), . . . , r(n)) s.t. (ω, r(1), . . . , r(n)) ∈ B ∧ ω ∈ Ω}.
Recall that r(i) = (r
(i)
1 , . . . , r
(i)
qi ) where r
(i)
j ∈ Si for 1 ≤ j ≤ qi. Since,
B′ ⊂ (Rω × Sq11 × . . .× Sl−1n )× Sqn−l+1n ,
by using the splitting lemma again we get
– ∃Ω′ ⊂ Rω × Sq11 × . . .× Sl−1n such that
Pr
[
(ω, r(1), . . . , r(n−1), (r(n)1 , . . . , r
(n)
l−1)) ∈ Ω′
]
≥ 14qnT ′(κ) .
– ∀(ω, r(1), . . . , r(n−1), (r(n)1 , . . . , r(n)l−1)) ∈ Ω′,
Pr
[
(ω, r(1), . . . , r(n−1), (r(n)1 , . . . , r
(n)
l−1, r
(n)
l , . . . , r
(n)
qn )) ∈ B′
]
≥ 14qnT ′(κ) ,
where the probability is taken over Sqn−l+1n .
As a result, if we choose l, ω, (r(1), . . . , r(n−1), (r(n)1 , . . . , r
(n)
l−1)), (r
(n)
l , . . . , r
(n)
qn ),
and (r′(n)l , . . . , r
′(n)
qn ) randomly, then we obtain two valid signatures
(σ0, . . . , σn, h1, . . . , hn) and (σ0, . . . , σ
′
n, h1, . . . , h
′
n) for message m with a non-
negligible probability such that hn = h′n.1
unionsq
Chosen-Message Attack Model
We now provide the Extended Forking Lemma in the adaptively chosen-message
attack model. In this model, an adversary may adaptively invoke a signing oracle
and is successful if it manages to compute a signature on a new message. If the
signing oracle outputs signatures which are indistinguishable from a genuine
signer without knowing the signing key, then using the simulator one can obtain
two distinct signatures with a suitable relation from a single signature, similarly
to the no-message scenario.
Theorem 1 (The Chosen-Message Extended Forking Lemma). Let S
be an n-generic signature scheme with security parameter κ. Let A be a PPT
algorithm given only the public data as input. We assume that A can ﬁnd a valid
signature (σ0, . . . , σn, h1, . . . , hn) for message m with a non-negligible probability,
after asking the n random oracles O1, . . . ,On, and the signer polynomially often
(in κ). Then, there exists another PPT algorithm B which has control over A by
replacing interactions with the real signer by a simulation, and which provides
with a non-negligible probability two valid signatures (σ0, . . . , σn, h1, . . . , hn) and
(σ0, . . . , σ
′
n, h1, . . . , h
′
n) for the same message m such that hn = h′n.
1 Since l is the index of A’s query and there are only polynomially number of queries
made by A, our success probability remains non-negligible when picking l randomly.
Extended Security Arguments for Signature Schemes 27
Proof. We consider a PPT algorithm B that executes A in such a way that B
simulates the environment of A. Therefore, B must simulate the interactions of
A with random oraclesO1, . . . ,On and with the real signer. Then, we could see B
as an algorithm performing a no-message attack against the signature scheme S.
Let Sim denote the zero-knowledge simulator of S that can simulate the an-
swers of the real signer without knowledge of the secret key and has access to
the random oracles Oi (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Let A be an adaptively chosen-message ad-
versary, which is a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine with a random
tape ω taken from a set Rω. During the attack, A may ask q1, . . . , qn queries to
random oracles O1, . . . ,On, and qs queries (possibly repeated) to Sim. The val-
ues q1, . . . , qn and qs are polynomially bounded in κ. We denote by q
(i)
1 , . . . , q
(i)
qi
the qi distinct queries to the random oracles Oi, and by m(1), . . . ,m(qs) the qs
queries to the simulator Sim.
The simulator Sim answers a tuple (σ
(j)
0 , . . . , σ
(j)
n , h
(j)
1 , . . . , h
(j)
n ) as a signature
for a message m(j), for each integer j with 1 ≤ j ≤ qs. Then, the adversary A
assumes that h
(j)
i = Oi(m(j), σ(j)0 , h(j)1 , . . . , h(j)i−1, σ(j)i−1) holds for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
and 1 ≤ j ≤ qs, and stores all these relations.
Now we need to consider potential “collisions” of queries in the random ora-
cles. There are two kind of collisions that can appear. That is, (a) the simulator
Sim queries the random oracle with the same input the adversary has asked
before (let us denote this event by E1), and (b) Sim asks the same question
repeatedly (let us denote this event by E2).
We show that the probabilities of such events are negligible.
Pr[E1] = Pr[∃i ∈ {1, . . . , n}; ∃j ∈ {1, . . . , qs}; ∃t ∈ {1, . . . , qn}|
(m(j), σ
(j)
0 , h
(j)
1 , . . . , h
(j)
i−1, σ
(j)
i−1) = q
(i)
t ]
≤
n∑
i=1
qs∑
j=1
qn∑
t=1
Pr[(m(j), σ
(j)
0 , h
(j)
1 , . . . , h
(j)
i−1, σ
(j)
i−1) = q
(i)
t ] ≤
nqsqn
2κ
,
which is negligible, assuming that the σi’s are random values drawn from a large
set with cardinality greater than 2κ.
Moreover, we have
Pr[E2] = Pr[∃i ∈ {1, . . . , n}; ∃j, j′ ∈ {1, . . . , qs} : j = j′|
(m(j), σ
(j)
0 , h
(j)
1 , . . . , h
(j)
i−1, σ
(j)
i−1) = (m
(j′), σ
(j′)
0 , h
(j′)
1 , . . . , h
(j′)
i−1, σ
(j′)
i−1)]
≤
n∑
i=1
qs∑
j=1
j∑
j′=1
Pr[(m(j), σ
(j)
0 , h
(j)
1 , . . . , h
(j)
i−1, σ
(j)
i−1) =
(m(j
′), σ
(j′)
0 , h
(j′)
1 , . . . , h
(j′)
i−1, σ
(j′)
i−1)] ≤
nq2s
2κ
,
which is also negligible.
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Algorithm B succeeds whenever the machine A produces a valid signature
without any collisions. Hence, we have
Pr[B succeeds ] = Pr[A succeeds ]−Pr[E1]−Pr[E2] ≥ 1
T (κ)
− nqsqn
2κ
− nq
2
s
2κ
,
which is non-negligible.
Summing up, we have an algorithm B that performs a no-message attack
against the signature scheme S in polynomial time with non-negligible proba-
bility of success. So we can use Lemma 2 applied to algorithm B, and we will
obtain two valid signatures for the same message, such that hn = h′n again in
polynomial time.
unionsq
3.3 Security of n-Generic Signature Schemes
Similar to generic signature schemes deﬁned by Pointcheval and Stern [12], for se-
curity under chosen-message attacks we require from n-generic signature schemes
a property which we call n-soundness. Informally, n-soundness means that the se-
cret key can be extracted from two correlated valid signatures
σ = (σ0, h1, . . . , σn−1, hn, σn) and σ′ = (σ0, h1, . . . , σn−1, h′n, σ′n) with hn = h′n
in polynomial-time and with a non-negligible probability. The notion of special-
soundness2 and n-soundness coincide if n = 1.
Definition 4 (n-Soundness). Let S = (KGen, Sign,Vf) be an n-generic sig-
nature scheme. We call S n-sound if there exists a PPT algorithm K, the
knowledge extractor, such that for any κ and m, any (sk, pk) ← KGen(1κ), any
σ = (σ0, h1, . . . , σn−1, hn, σn) and σ′ = (σ0, h1, . . . , σn−1, h′n, σ′n) with
Vf(pk,m, σ) = Vf(pk,m, σ′) = 1 and h′n = hn, we have sk ← K(pk, σ, σ′) with
non-negligible probability.
The following theorem states that all n-generic signature schemes satisfying n-
soundness are existentially unforgeable under adaptively chosen-message attacks
in the random oracle model.
Theorem 2 (Security of n-Generic Signature Schemes). Let S be an n-
generic signature scheme satisfying n-soundness with underlying hard problem
P. Let κ be the security parameter. Then, S is existentially unforgeable under
adaptively chosen-message attacks.
Proof. We assume that the underlying hardness P of the n-generic signature
scheme is hard, i.e., for all PPT algorithms A the probability to solve a hard
instance of P is negligible. The key generation algorithm KGen of S outputs a se-
cret and public key pair (sk, pk) derived by a hard instance and its corresponding
solution of the problem P.
2 Actually, special-soundness is a notion belonging to identiﬁcation schemes. However,
since this property is quite similar to the required property of generic signature
schemes, this concept is used for both cases in the literature.
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Now, assume by contradiction, that S is not existentially unforgeable under
chosen-message attacks. That is, there exists a PPT algorithm B1 such that B1
is able to output a signature σ∗ = (σ0, h1, . . . , σn−1, hn, σn) for a fresh message
m∗ with non-negligible probability. Then, due to the Extended Forking Lemma,
one can construct a PPT algorithm B2 which outputs two correlated signatures
σ∗ = (σ0, h1, . . . , σn−1, hn, σn) and σ∗∗ = (σ0, h1, . . . , σn−1, h′n, σ
′
n) with non-
negligible probability such that hn = h′n .
Due to the n-soundness of S, we know that there exists an “extractor” which
extracts the secret key given the two signatures above. This contradicts with the
assumption that the underlying problem P is hard, and by implication, we learn
that there cannot exist such a successful forger B1.
4 Applications
In this section we ﬁrst discuss a transformation from (2n + 1)-pass identiﬁca-
tion protocols with a special structure to signature schemes that in many cases
yields n-generic signature schemes. This is essentially an extended Fiat-Shamir
transform. Then we go on with a speciﬁc instance of the aforementioned trans-
formation. We obtain a new signature scheme based on multivariate polynomials
by applying our method to a ﬁve-pass identiﬁcation scheme recently introduced
in [14].
4.1 n-Generic Signature Schemes Derived from Identification
Schemes
Our goal is to enlarge the class of identiﬁcation protocols to which the Fiat-
Shamir transformation can be applied. We identify a potential set of candidates
that we name n-canonical identiﬁcation schemes. By n-canonical identiﬁcation
we mean schemes secure with respect to impersonation against passive attacks,
where the challenges are drawn from an uniform distribution and have 2n + 1
moves.
Definition 5 (n-canonical Identification Protocol). An n-canonical iden-
tiﬁcation scheme IS = (K,P ,V) is a (2n + 1)-pass interactive protocol. K and
P = (P1, . . . ,Pn+1) are PPT algorithms whereas V = (ChSet,Vf) with ChSet be-
ing a PPT algorithm and Vf a deterministic boolean algorithm. These algorithms
are deﬁned as follows:
K(1κ) upon input a security parameter 1κ, outputs a secret and public key (sk, pk)
and challenge spaces G1, . . . , Gn with 1/|Gi| negligible in 1κ.
P1(sk) upon input a secret key sk outputs the commitment R1.
Pi(sk, R1, C1, . . . , Ri−1, Ci−1) for i = 2, . . . , n, upon input a secret key sk and the
current transcript R1, C1, . . . , Ri−1, Ci−1, outputs the i-th commitment Ri.
Pn+1(sk, R1, C1, . . . , Rn, Cn) upon input a secret key sk and the current tran-
script R1, C1, . . . , Rn, Cn, outputs a response Rsp.
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ChSet(pk, i) upon input a public key pk and round number i, outputs a challenge
Ci ∈ Gi.
Vf(pk, R1, C1, . . . , Rn, Cn, Rsp) upon input a public key pk, and the current tran-
script R1, C1, . . . , Rn, Cn, Rsp, outputs either 1 (= valid) or 0 (= invalid).
An n-canonical identiﬁcation scheme IS has the following properties.
Public-Coin. For any index i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and any (sk, pk, G1, . . . , Gn) ←
K(1κ) the challenge Ci ← ChSet(pk, i) is uniform in Gi.
Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge. There exists a PPT algorithm Z, the zero-
knowledge simulator, such that for any pair of PPT algorithms D = (D0, D1)
the following distributions are computationally indistinguishable:
– Let (pk, sk, state) ← D0(1κ), and trans = (R1, C1, . . . , Rn, Cn, Rsp) ←
〈P(sk, pk),V(pk)〉 if pk belongs to sk, and otherwise trans ← ⊥. Output
D1(trans, state).
– Let (pk, sk, state) ← D0(1κ), and trans = (R1, C1, . . . , Rn, Cn, Rsp) ←
Z(pk, 1) if pk belongs to sk, and otherwise trans ← Z(pk, 0). Output
D1(trans, state).
Note that the deﬁnition of 1-canonical identiﬁcation schemes is identical to that
of canonical identiﬁcation schemes [1]. An extended Fiat-Shamir transform is ap-
plied to an n-canonical identiﬁcation scheme and yields an n-generic signature
scheme, just as the original Fiat-Shamir transform yields a generic signature
scheme in [12]. The idea of this transformation consists on replacing the uni-
formly random challenges of the veriﬁer as set by ChSet in the identiﬁcation
scheme by the outputs of some secure hash functions Hi : {0, 1}∗ → Gi mod-
eled as random oracles. More precisely, let IS = (K,P ,V) be an n-canonical
identiﬁcation scheme. The joint execution of P(sk, pk) and V(pk) then deﬁnes
an interactive protocol between the prover P and the veriﬁer V . At the end of
the protocol V outputs a decision bit b ∈ {0, 1}. An n-generic signature scheme
S = (KGen, Sign,Vf) is derived as follows:
KGen(1κ) takes as input security parameter 1κ and returns K(1κ).
Sign(sk,m) takes as input a secret key sk and a message m and returns the
transcript 〈P(sk, pk),V(pk)〉 as the signature σ, i.e.,
σ = (σ0, h1, . . . , hn, σn) = (R1, C1, . . . , Rn, Cn, Rsp)
or simply σ = (σ0, . . . , σn, h1 . . . , hn) = (R1, . . . , Rn, Rsp, C1, . . . , Cn). Here,
Ci is deﬁned by the equation Ci := Hi(m,R1, . . . , Ri, C1, . . . , Ci−1).
Vf(pk,m, σ) takes as input a public key pk, a message m and a signature σ and
returns V .Vf(pk,m, σ)3 as the decision bit.
3 By V.Vf(pk,m, σ) we mean the veriﬁcation algorithm performed by the veriﬁer from
the underlying identiﬁcation scheme IS.
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The resulting scheme S is an n-generic signature scheme. Indeed, the obtained
scheme S has the right structure and the honest-veriﬁer zero-knowledge property
is guaranteed by (the similar property of) the identiﬁcation scheme.
However, it is still not guaranteed that S is existentially unforgeable. It lacks
then to check/prove that the resulting scheme S is n-sound. If this is the case
then one can apply Theorem 2 and S is guaranteed to have security against
adaptive chosen-message attacks.
Let us point out that the plain version of most identiﬁcation protocols does
not directly satisfy the required security level by their choice of challenges spaces
G1, . . . , Gn. In particular, it might be the case that 1/|Gi| is not negligible in
the security parameter 1κ. For that reason, one should typically repeat the ID
protocol several (say δ) times until the desired security level is reached. In that
case the concatenation of δ transcripts 〈P(sk, pk),V(pk)〉 builds the signature
(instead of a single execution of the ID scheme). Moreover, for our security
analysis, we consider that the commitments Ri in all contain more entropy than
kn, the output size of the last hash function. This condition can be achieved by
choosing their domain as large as necessary. Note that in [12] it is assumed that
R1 is uniformly distributed over its corresponding set.
4.2 Examples
Many zero-knowledge identiﬁcation schemes have been proposed, whose conver-
sion to signature schemes does not lead to generic signature schemes according
to the deﬁnition of Pointcheval and Stern [12]. Examples of such schemes are
those based on the Permuted Kernel Problem [15,8], the Permuted Perceptron
Problem [10,11], the Constrained Linear Equations [18], the ﬁve-pass variant
of SD problem [17,2], the q-SD problem [4], the SIS problem [3,16] and the
MQ-problem [14]. Fortunately, their conversion to signature schemes belong to
the class of n-generic signature schemes. Unlike [10,11], they even satisfy n-
soundness. Consequently, our result for security of n-generic signature schemes
satisfying n-soundness carries over to the resulting signature schemes derived
from all these aforementioned identiﬁcation schemes in the random oracle model.
We provide next the security argument for the resulting signature scheme
derived from the MQ-based identiﬁcation scheme [14]. The conversion of all
aforementioned identiﬁcation schemes to n-generic signature schemes and its
security can be formulated in a very similar fashion. For this reason, we omit
these proofs here.
The (Five-Pass) MQ Identification Scheme [14] and Its Signature. Re-
cently at Crypto 2011, Sakumoto et al. presented a ﬁve-pass public-key identiﬁ-
cation scheme based on multivariate quadratic polynomials [14]. Assuming the
existence of a non-interactive commitment scheme Com which should be statisti-
cally hiding and computationally binding, the authors of [14] showed that their
scheme is an honest-veriﬁer zero-knowledge identiﬁcation scheme whereas the
n-soundness property is also veriﬁed as we will later see in the security analysis.
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We ﬁrst brieﬂy describe the identiﬁcation scheme [14], following the procedure
to convert it into a signature scheme using Section 4.1. Finally, we analyze the
security of the obtained signature scheme using the Extended Forking Lemma
discussed in Section 3.2.
Let n,m and q be positive integers. We denote by MQ(n,m,Fq) a family of
functions
{F (x) = (f1(x), · · · , fm(x)) |
fl(x) =
∑
i,j
al,i,jxixj +
∑
i
bl,ixi, al,i,j , bl,i ∈ Fq for l = 1, · · · ,m},
where x = (x1, · · · , xn). An element F ofMQ(n,m,Fq) is called an MQ function
and a function G(x, y) = F (x+ y)− F (x)− F (y) is called the polar form of F .
Let κ be a security parameter. Let n = n(κ),m = m(κ) and q = q(κ) be
polynomially bounded functions. The key-generation algorithm K of this iden-
tiﬁcation scheme can be described as follows. It takes 1κ as input and creates a
system parameter F ∈ MQ(n,m,Fq) which consists of an m-tuple of random
multivariate quadratic polynomials. Then, it randomly chooses a vector s ∈ Fnq
(secret key), and computes the corresponding public key v := F (s). Finally, it
returns the key pair (pk, sk) = (v, s). Figure 1 illustrates the interaction protocol
between the prover and the veriﬁer.
Prover P(s, v) Verifier V(v)
r0, t0
$←− Fnq , e0 $←− Fmq
r1 ← s− r0
c0 ← Com (r0, t0, e0)
c1 ← Com (r1, G(t0, r1) + e0) c0, c1−−−−−−−−−−−→
α←−−−−−−−−−−− α $←− Fq
t1 ← αr0 − t0
e1 ← αF (r0)− e0 (t1, e1)−−−−−−−−−−−→
b←−−−−−−−−−−− b $←− {0, 1}
If b = 0:
r0−−−−−−−−−−−→ Check c0 ?= Com(r0, αr0 − t1,
αF (r0)− e1)
Else:
r1−−−−−−−−−−−→ Check c1 ?= Com(r1, α(v − F (r1))
−G(t1, r1)− e1)
Fig. 1. The ﬁve-pass MQ identiﬁcation scheme
The resulting Signature Scheme and its Security. According to Section 4.1, the
MQ-based identiﬁcation scheme described above can be turned to an n-generic
signature scheme S = (KGen, Sign,Vf) as follows. Let δ be the number of rounds
needed to achieve the required impersonation resistance.
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KGen(1κ) takes as input a security parameter 1κ and outputs K(1κ). The ran-
dom oracles O1 and O2 output elements of Fq and {0, 1}, respectively.
Sign(sk,m) takes as input sk and a message m, and computes for all 1 ≤ i ≤ δ,
– r1,i = s− r0,i where r0,i $←− Fnq ,
– c0,i = Com (r0,i, t0,i, e0,i) , c1,i = Com (r1,i, G(t0,i, r1,i) + e0,i), and sets
σ0,i = (c0,i, c1,i), where t0,i
$←− Fnq and e0,i $←− Fmq ,
– h1,i ∈ Fq such that h1,i = O1(m,σ0,i),
– (t1,i, e1,i) = (h1,ir0,i − t0,i, h1,iF (r0,i)− e0,i) and sets σ1,i = (t1,i, e1,i),
– h2,i such that h2,i = O2(m,σ0,i, h1,i, σ1,i),
– (σ0,i, h1,i, σ1,i, h2,i, σ2,i), where σ2,i := r0,i if h2,i = 0 and, otherwise,
σ2,i := r1,i,
– and ﬁnally, returns the signature σ for the messagem as (σ0, h1, σ1, h2, σ2),
where σj = (σj,1, . . . , σj,δ) and hk = (hk,1, . . . , hk,δ) with 0 ≤ j ≤ 2 and
1 ≤ k ≤ 2.
Vf(pk,m, σ) takes as input a public key pk, a message m and a signature σ,
outputs 1 iﬀ (σ0,1, . . . , σ0,δ) is well calculated as in the identiﬁcation protocol,
i.e., the following respective equation is valid for all 1 ≤ i ≤ δ:
If h2,i = 0 : c0,i = Com (r0,i, h1,ir0,i − t1,i, h1,iF (r0,i)− e1,i)
If h2,i = 1 : c1,i = Com (r1,i, h1,i(v − F (r1,i))−G(t1,i, r1,i)− e1,i)
Security Argument. Using the Extended Forking Lemma, we prove in the fol-
lowing that the signature scheme derived from the MQ-based zero-knowledge
identiﬁcation scheme is secure against adaptively chosen message attacks. We
assume that an adversary produces a valid signature (σ0, h1, σ1, h2, σ2) for a mes-
sage m. By applying Theorem 1 we can ﬁnd a second forgery (σ0, h1, σ1, h
′
2, σ
′
2)
with a non-negligible probability, such that h2 = h′2. That leads to the existence
of an index i with 1 ≤ i ≤ δ, such that h2,i = h′2,i. W.l.o.g. assume h2,i = 0
and h′2,i = 1. Now, the adversary gets the answers for two distinct challenges,
namely r0,i and r1,i. Finally, by adding the last two values, the secret key can
be disclosed. This contradicts the intractability of the MQ problem.
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